


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## MEMORANDUM

DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

*The Situation in Vietnam*

Top Secret

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27 November 1966

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Information as of 1600  
27 November 1966

HIGHLIGHTS

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I. The Military Situation in South Vietnam:  
There were no reports of significant contact with the Viet Cong over the weekend. (Para. 1). Final VC casualty report and a partial list of items either captured or destroyed in Operation ATTLEBORO are given (Para. 2).

II. The Political Situation in South Vietnam:  
The Viet Cong's announcement of a cease-fire for Christmas and New Year differs in several respects from that of last year (Paras. 1-4).

IV. Other Communist Military Developments:  
There is nothing of significance to report.

V. Communist Political Developments: A member of the French parliament offers some interesting observations on the North Vietnamese scene (Paras. 1-4). North Vietnamese students in China have been ordered to return to the DRV.

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I. THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. There were no reports of significant contact with the Viet Cong in any of the 28 battalion size or larger ground operations under way in South Vietnam over the weekend. US forces are conducting 11 of these operations, one is Australian, and 16 are South Vietnamese.

2. The final Viet Cong casualty report from Operation ATTLEBORO shows 1,106 VC killed, 44 captured, and 60 suspects taken. In addition, the following is a partial list of items either captured or destroyed during ATTLEBORO.

<u>Equipment Captured</u>	<u>Equipment Destroyed</u>
128 individual weapons	297 buildings
19 crew served weapons	502 bunkers
2 M/79 grenade launchers	92 tunnels
5,142 rounds small arms ammo	9 base camps
35 mortar rounds	1 claymore factory
13 rockets	37 caves
514 claymore mines	1,600 small arms/mortar/ artillery rounds
25,273 grenades of various types	132 grenades
1,075 pounds of explosive	79 mines/booby traps
4,000 blasting caps/booby trap ignitors	1,263 tons of rice
752 bangalore torpedoes	7,955 pounds of fish
500 fuzing devices	9,000 pounds of tobacco
80 grenade launchers	
500 rifle grenade adaptors	
400 claymore mine stands	
1,121 tons of rice	
123 pounds of documents	
151 bicycles	

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II. THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. The central committee of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) announced its intention to order a temporary cessation of hostilities for 48-hour periods during the Christmas and New Year's holiday. According to the 26 November broadcast, the Christmas truce will extend from 0700 on 24 December to 0700 26 December. The New Year's truce period will cover the period 0700 on 31 December 1966 to 0700 2 January 1967.

2. The announcement differs in several respects from that of last year. The duration of the truce is longer, two 48-hour periods as opposed to one 12-hour period for Christmas only last year. Secondly, the announcement was made in the name of the presidium of the central committee rather than under the sponsorship of the central committee alone as in 1965. Finally, the announcement comes 12 days earlier than the one last year on 7 December, in what appears to be an effort to beat out any similar GVN/allied nations truce declaration.

3. The decision to suspend military attacks during these periods was made, according to the central committee announcement, to display the deep understanding of the South Vietnamese people toward the struggle movement of the American people and people of "US satellite countries." The message is also heavily laced with propaganda about the righteousness of the Communist cause and appeals to the people of the allied nations to urge the recall of their troops from South Vietnam.

4. While the Liberation Army is cautioned to observe the truce periods by the central committee, the people are also warned to be alert to enemy plots to distort the meaning of the cease-fire arrangement. This latter warning is evidently predicated on the Front's fears that the allies will exploit the truce offer as a sign of weakness.

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IV. OTHER COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

1. There is nothing of significance to report.

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V. COMMUNIST POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

1. Two articles by Jacques Duhamel who just returned from a visit to North Vietnam offer standard but interesting observations on the North Vietnamese scene. Duhamel is described as a member of the French parliament, a middle-of-the-road politician and former chief aide to Edgar Faure when he was premier.

2. Duhamel's most interesting account was of conversation with Premier Pham Van Dong in which Dong stated that the DRV "would like to make the US understand that we will continue to fight as long as the US Government believes it can dominate us by force." Dong also reiterated the four points.

3. A North Vietnamese Peace Committee official told Duhamel that the DRV must demonstrate its determination and strength. The French visitor interpreted this remark to indicate a fear in Hanoi that negotiations begun without clearcut preconditions will be taken as a sign of North Vietnamese weakness. Duhamel concluded that a cessation of US bombing was a necessary precondition to bring about negotiations but that such a cessation may not suffice by itself.

4. The French observer also noted that the bombing has slowed down transportation--shipments previously taking three days now take three weeks--but that supplies are still moving. There is rationing in Hanoi but no long queues. He also observed that the air strikes are neither so frequent or inaccurate as to create fright or permanent tension among the city dwellers.

DRV Students in China Returning Home

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total number of North Vietnamese students in China is unknown. One report claimed that 3,000 have recently been sent home.

6. In September the Chinese Communists requested foreign students to go home because Chinese educational institutions have been closed due to the "cultural revolution." The Chinese reportedly offered to make special arrangements for the continued training of North Vietnamese students but Hanoi is alleged to have refused.

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